If it quacks like a duck.....it's probably a pundit
There's an otherwise interesting article today on National Journal by Carl Cannon that contains an often repeated stupidity that maintains that because of the 22nd Amendment, presidents are effectively "lame ducks" during the entirety of their second term.
Presidents (or any elected person) are "lame ducks" only when their time in office is so short that they simply won't have time to address any issues. To the extent this magical point can be identified for the Presidency, it likely falls sometime between the nominating conventions and January 20.
Obviously the President retains his full constitutional powers through Noon January 20. Just as obviously he can respond to emergencies or developing situations through that same time. However it is unquestioned that in terms of new policies that require Congressional approval, the President becomes quite lame some time in the late Spring or early Summer of his last full year in office.
Having said that, the fact remains that many pundits and experts apparently think the president is lamed by his own re-election. In fact they seem to think that while being elected or re-elected is rather ho-hum, being ELIGIBLE for re-election gives one a mysterious power over political opponents.
Here Cannon makes a statement and then quotes Stanley Kutler:
"....it is fair to say that the 22nd Amendment introduced a systemic weakness to the highest office in the land.
"It makes a president a lame duck on the first day of his second term," said Stanley Kutler, a retired history professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School. "A president in his first term is able by sheer dint of will, personality, and power to push things through Congress that some congressmen may not particularly like. But it all ends in the second term because he's no longer a threat to them in the same way. He can't run again. There is a built-in factor weakening the president."
I think that is all very wrong but the really absurd words are these:
"It makes a president a lame duck on the first day of his second term...He can't run again"
Kutler clearly believes that a re-elected President's inability to be re-elected, AGAIN, makes him ineffective. Balderdash. A newly re-elected President has FOUR years left in his term. That is two years more than all 435 members of the House and 1/3 of the Senate. Years 5 & 6 of a Presidential term are actually the years where he SHOULD exercise the MOST power. After all, he has just been re-elected! His policies have just been re-affirmed by the voters. In George W. Bush's case he won re-election by a wider margin than he was first elected by, with none of the "Florida Fiasco" to deal with.
Beginning with Year 7 there is a new dynamic at work. Now the President is on different footing as most major policy changes take several years to be ironed out. The president is running out of time. He would best use his time tying up loose ends and tending to international relations as opposed to launching large domestic initiatives.
The President is still not a lame duck, but his administration is starting to limp a bit and this becomes more pronounced as Year 7 (and 2007 is Year 7 for George W. Bush) proceeds. In Bush's case his approval ratings are so low that he as very little room left to maneuver. However I'll give him till about next June or July before comfortably thinking of pasting on the "lame duck" label.
Monday, July 23, 2007
Why and What Now - Part 3
Last Fall after the 2006 elections I began a three part look at why the Democrats had such a good time of it. Here at last is the final installment.
My hypothesis on why 2006 was a good year for Democrats is based on a theory (explained here in Part 1 and Part 2) of the segmentation of the American voting public. I theorized that the voting public falls roughly into seven segments. For additional clarity I have renamed several of the groups while leaving their distinctions intact:
A. Republicans
B. Republican Leaning
C. Right of Center
D. Independents
E. Left of Center
F. Democrat Leaning
G. Democrats
Clearly both Democrats and Republicans always get their bases (A&G) which I peg at about 35% each. Next they almost always get the voters that lean their way (B&F) for another 5% each. These groups tend to vote in high numbers even when their party is down. In 2006 virtually all voters in these four groups voted the standard "party line". It is highly likely that Group B voted less robustly than normal while Group F did the opposite, thus modestly solidifying a big night for the Democrats.
It is in the middle three groups that elections are won and lost. Right of Center/Left of Center voters have no allegiance to party. Their natural ideological bent is clearly in the direction of one party or the other but there is no fealty attached to that fact. Thus Groups C & E are greatly affected by what choices they are presented with at the ballot box.
Whereas Group B will hold their nose and vote for a weak Republican out of a vestige of party loyalty, Group C has no such compunction and often will just stay home. However, due to ideology, Group C rarely will vote for a Democrat unless that candidate is a true centrist. To state it another way, Groups C & E vote only when there is a candidate available whose IDEAS they support.
In 2006 Group E liked what Democrats were saying and as usual loathed what Republicans were saying. Thus Group E turned out in heavy numbers for the Democratic candidates. Conversely Group C was out of patience with the Republicans and did not find any clues that the GOP would change after election day. Furthermore the Democrats were essentially still worse (from this group's perspective), thus Group C spent election day shopping, working, hiking or doing anything but voting.
When Group C looked at all the candidates and found them all lacking and did not vote, that drove the final nail in the Republicans' self-built coffin. George Allen, Jim Talent, and Conrad Burns all lost because Group C stayed home while Group E voted in droves.
Finally we have the true Independents. People who don't identify with the ideology of either party. This group must be further divided into two sub-groups. The first sub-group doesn't have ideological moorings of any kind. They tend to vote "for the man" and generally don't gravitate toward polarizing figures. They are primarily upper-middle to upper income, very well educated and vote in high numbers. These voters don't much like failures or goof ups so they tend to vote for candidates who are close to the center, speak well, and appear to be intelligent.
These independents normally break pretty much 50-50 if the two parties each have presentable and moderate candidates. To the extent one party or the other nominates either a more strident ideologue or someone who seems less than gifted intellectually, Independents will skew the other direction.
In 2006 the Republicans were the Keystone Kops. From George W. Bush's mangling of English, to the Vice-President shooting a fellow hunter, to the intern scandal and out of control spending, the GOP looked like a bunch of hapless hacks. To voters in this group that is unforgivable. In another year these voters might well have elected Senator Steele from Maryland and Senator Kean from New Jersey. In 2006 they likely went something on the order of 3-1 or 4-1 for Democrats and in so doing sealed the Republican swamping.
The second sub-group are fringe players who vote to "make a statement" or indulge their personal whimsy of the moment. They go for oddballs and extremists and tend to vote for guys like Nader, Buchanan, and whoever is running on the Libertarian ticket. They have a very limited impact on who actually wins or loses because they usually either vote for a candidate who doesn't have a chance or they don't vote at all.
In summation I want to make it clear that this is MY take on 2006. I'm not claiming that proof exists to back up my belief. Intuitively this what I think happens in politics:
Swings in political fortunes are not primarily attributable to voters who switch back and forth from one party to the other from one election to the next.
Instead, the key difference is who votes and who doesn't.
EDITORIAL NOTE: I revised and added to this post on July 25, 2007, upon realizing I had dropped some of my analysis (relating to independents) between my notes and the keyboard.
Last Fall after the 2006 elections I began a three part look at why the Democrats had such a good time of it. Here at last is the final installment.
My hypothesis on why 2006 was a good year for Democrats is based on a theory (explained here in Part 1 and Part 2) of the segmentation of the American voting public. I theorized that the voting public falls roughly into seven segments. For additional clarity I have renamed several of the groups while leaving their distinctions intact:
A. Republicans
B. Republican Leaning
C. Right of Center
D. Independents
E. Left of Center
F. Democrat Leaning
G. Democrats
Clearly both Democrats and Republicans always get their bases (A&G) which I peg at about 35% each. Next they almost always get the voters that lean their way (B&F) for another 5% each. These groups tend to vote in high numbers even when their party is down. In 2006 virtually all voters in these four groups voted the standard "party line". It is highly likely that Group B voted less robustly than normal while Group F did the opposite, thus modestly solidifying a big night for the Democrats.
It is in the middle three groups that elections are won and lost. Right of Center/Left of Center voters have no allegiance to party. Their natural ideological bent is clearly in the direction of one party or the other but there is no fealty attached to that fact. Thus Groups C & E are greatly affected by what choices they are presented with at the ballot box.
Whereas Group B will hold their nose and vote for a weak Republican out of a vestige of party loyalty, Group C has no such compunction and often will just stay home. However, due to ideology, Group C rarely will vote for a Democrat unless that candidate is a true centrist. To state it another way, Groups C & E vote only when there is a candidate available whose IDEAS they support.
In 2006 Group E liked what Democrats were saying and as usual loathed what Republicans were saying. Thus Group E turned out in heavy numbers for the Democratic candidates. Conversely Group C was out of patience with the Republicans and did not find any clues that the GOP would change after election day. Furthermore the Democrats were essentially still worse (from this group's perspective), thus Group C spent election day shopping, working, hiking or doing anything but voting.
When Group C looked at all the candidates and found them all lacking and did not vote, that drove the final nail in the Republicans' self-built coffin. George Allen, Jim Talent, and Conrad Burns all lost because Group C stayed home while Group E voted in droves.
Finally we have the true Independents. People who don't identify with the ideology of either party. This group must be further divided into two sub-groups. The first sub-group doesn't have ideological moorings of any kind. They tend to vote "for the man" and generally don't gravitate toward polarizing figures. They are primarily upper-middle to upper income, very well educated and vote in high numbers. These voters don't much like failures or goof ups so they tend to vote for candidates who are close to the center, speak well, and appear to be intelligent.
These independents normally break pretty much 50-50 if the two parties each have presentable and moderate candidates. To the extent one party or the other nominates either a more strident ideologue or someone who seems less than gifted intellectually, Independents will skew the other direction.
In 2006 the Republicans were the Keystone Kops. From George W. Bush's mangling of English, to the Vice-President shooting a fellow hunter, to the intern scandal and out of control spending, the GOP looked like a bunch of hapless hacks. To voters in this group that is unforgivable. In another year these voters might well have elected Senator Steele from Maryland and Senator Kean from New Jersey. In 2006 they likely went something on the order of 3-1 or 4-1 for Democrats and in so doing sealed the Republican swamping.
The second sub-group are fringe players who vote to "make a statement" or indulge their personal whimsy of the moment. They go for oddballs and extremists and tend to vote for guys like Nader, Buchanan, and whoever is running on the Libertarian ticket. They have a very limited impact on who actually wins or loses because they usually either vote for a candidate who doesn't have a chance or they don't vote at all.
In summation I want to make it clear that this is MY take on 2006. I'm not claiming that proof exists to back up my belief. Intuitively this what I think happens in politics:
Swings in political fortunes are not primarily attributable to voters who switch back and forth from one party to the other from one election to the next.
Instead, the key difference is who votes and who doesn't.
EDITORIAL NOTE: I revised and added to this post on July 25, 2007, upon realizing I had dropped some of my analysis (relating to independents) between my notes and the keyboard.
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